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ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews recent agricultural policy changes in China and presents estimates of domestic support 
for the period 1996-2005. A set of relevant alternative subsidy-definition scenarios and their effects on the 
calculated levels of support are analyzed, and a projection of domestic support through 2013 is presented. 
The paper concludes with a discussion of new WTO rules that may be negotiated in the Doha Round and 
their implications for China.  
Based on standard WTO subsidy calculation methods, our results indicated that China’s domestic 
support for the period 1996-2005 has been well below the limits agreed at its WTO accession. The market 
price support (MPS) component of the aggregate measure of support (AMS) in China has been below 
zero, and this has dwarfed the relatively small but positive non-product specific AMS and led to a zero 
current total AMS after de minimis. China has no AMS commitments but can provide trade-distorting 
domestic support to agricultural producers up to 8.5 percent of the value of production (or RMB561 
billion). Thus there appears to be substantial room for China to extend its amber box subsidy measures 
through heavy use of the de minimis provision.  
We project domestic support notifications through 2013 based on specified assumptions about 
domestic policies, including changes in administered prices and commodity program coverage. New rules 
potentially negotiated in the Doha Round are expected to provide more constraints on subsidies. Due to 
China’s developing country status, with no AMS commitments under the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture the impacts of these new constraints are shown to be limited, although our projections 
indicate that China may exceed its WTO commitment levels under certain price and commodity coverage 
scenarios. 
Keywords:  China agricultural support policies; WTO Doha Round; notification of domestic 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
Chinese agricultural policy has undergone some fundamental changes in the past decade, with major 
policy shifts in pricing, marketing, trade, investment and technology. Most notably, China has 
implemented a series of new policies that directly favor the agricultural sector (Kwiecinski and van 
Tongeren 2007). These policies include direct payments to farmers, agricultural input subsidies, 
agricultural tax elimination, minimum and protective prices, dismantlement of barriers to private entry 
into agricultural marketing channels, and increased spending on rural infrastructure, research and 
development. The policy changes have resulted in higher support for the agricultural sector, which has 
been documented in various studies. For instance, the Producer Support Estimates (PSE) compiled by the 
OECD (2007) show a clear rising trend in subsidies in China since 1993 (Figure 1). Considering this 
finding in combination with empirical evidence disclosing disprotection in agriculture in earlier periods 
(e.g., Huang et al. 2007), one could conclude that there has been a transition of government policy stance 
from taxing agriculture to supporting the sector.  
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Source: OECD 2007  
Recent agricultural policy changes reflect the Chinese leadership’s renewed attention to 
agricultural problems, concisely described in official documents as the “San Nong” issue (agriculture, 
rural areas, and peasants). The policy changes also arrived amidst a sharply widening rural-urban income 
gap as well as rising social unrest and political tension. In a series of “No.1 Documents” issued by the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, it is reiterated that increasing farm incomes is at the 
top of the leadership’s agenda. The authorities believe that the provision of various subsidies to farmers 
will effectively raise their incomes, which would, in turn, pacify the widespread resentment against the 
present social economic system that has disproportionately benefited people in urban areas. The objective 
of self-sufficiency in food supply (grains in particular) is also embedded in the subsidy strategy because 
farmers are expected to produce more when provided with better economic incentives. Recent economic 
growth has made these subsidy policy changes fiscally feasible. 
The impacts of China’s new subsidy policies are far-reaching both within the country and 
internationally. The elimination of agricultural taxes and the provision of direct payments to farmers, for 
example, have been lauded domestically as major achievements in China’s agricultural policy reforms—
Chinese farmers are for the first time in the country’s history being subsidized rather than taxed by the 
government, a transition that is intended to add significantly to the country’s progress in poverty 
reduction. In the trade arena, however, there is a potential concern that some of the policies may prove 2 
 
contentious during the Doha Round negotiations, just as agricultural subsidies in developed countries 
have been under intense scrutiny from the Uruguay Round onward. As China’s influence on the world 
economy continues to increase, the global implications of its domestic policies will receive more 
attention. Specifically, one would question whether China’s subsidy policy measures meet the disciplines 
of the current WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and whether they will fit within tighter rules that 
may be negotiated in the future, especially if China continues its current trend of increasing agricultural 
subsidies. 
Compliance with WTO rules (or lack thereof) can be monitored by referring to each country’s 
official subsidy notifications, which may be challenged by others through informal or formal procedures 
(e.g., review or dispute settlement). Each WTO member country is expected to routinely update 
notifications on the implementation of its domestic support commitments for monitoring by the WTO 
Committee on Agriculture. These notifications serve as the primary source of information on each 
country’s domestic agricultural subsidy outlays, and on how such subsidies have been classified—as 
exempt from or subject to reduction commitments. 
Unfortunately, however, few WTO members have regularly reported their domestic support 
notifications.
1 China has provided estimates of domestic support in its accession documents for the period 
1996-1998 (WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3) and updated them for 1999-2001 (G/AG/CHN/8). However, due to 
the lack of disciplines for notifications in the WTO and the intrinsic difficulty of obtaining subsidy data in 
a timely fashion (e.g., actual budgetary expenditures are often not known until well after a particular crop-
production year), no official filing of notifications has been made for China beyond 2001, the year it 
became a member of the WTO. Apart from annual monitoring by the OECD, little is known in the outside 
world about how much support (in WTO terms) China has provided its agriculture in recent years, or 
whether China has complied with the relevant WTO rules. Recent agricultural policy reforms and the 
delay in official reporting suggest the need for an investigation into the consequences of policy changes in 
terms of China’s WTO commitments in regard to domestic support as well as a projection of future 
notifications examining possible ramifications of continued policy development within China and at the 
WTO.  
This paper attempts to provide a quantitative assessment for China of “shadow notifications” in 
which recent subsidy information is presented and changes in domestic policies and market conditions are 
discussed. In addition to providing basic notification calculations, several important controversies about 
different subsidy definitions and interpretation of the WTO rules are assessed. Future subsidies and their 
WTO compliance are projected and evaluated through 2013.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of China’s 
agricultural sector. Section 3 reviews recent agricultural policy changes. Section 4 presents estimates of 
China’s domestic support for the period 1996-2005 and discusses a set of relevant alternative subsidy-
definition scenarios and their effects on the calculated levels of support. Section 5 describes the projection 
of domestic support through 2013 and discusses new constraints/latitude that may potentially be 
negotiated in the Doha Round with implications for China. Section 6 provides a summary. 
                                                      
1 According to most recent WTO data, 1995 was the only year for which all members with domestic support reduction 
commitments for that year had submitted a notification. For 2000, out of 30 countries with commitments, 25 (or 83 percent) had 
submitted a notification. For 2003, of the 35 countries with commitments, 8 (or 23 percent) had submitted a notification and 27 
were overdue.  3 
 
2.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
China has a vast agricultural sector encompassing more than half of the population. The sector has 
witnessed considerable achievements since economic reforms were initiated in 1978. However, despite 
long-term growth, the agricultural sector has lagged significantly behind its urban counterpart. Incomes in 
rural areas, after a few years of strong growth in the early years of the reform, have stayed well below 
those in urban areas (Figure 2). The rising urban-rural income gap has become the most significant source 
of China’s whole income disparity problem (Chang 2002). The rapidly expanding urban sector and the 
development of rural off-farm employment in township and village enterprises (TVEs) have alleviated the 
problem of surplus rural labor to some extent, but restrictions from the household registration (“hukou”) 
system and other preferential employment treatments favoring only urban residents continue to constrain 
rural labor mobility. Today, a large share of China’s idle population remains in rural areas, contributing to 
a high overall unemployment rate that has reached 14 percent in recent years (Giles, Park and Zhang 
2005). This massive labor surplus in rural areas has also resulted in a high ratio of labor per unit of land 
and thus low labor productivity and agricultural returns.  
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Agricultural production in China is characterized by a combination of scarce land, abundant 
labor, limited mechanization and small-scale operations. The sector employs approximately 350 million 
people, or 45 percent of the total labor force, and the average farm size is less than 0.5 hectares (Fan and 
Chan-Kang 2005). Income from agriculture is an important component of the Chinese economy, although 
its contribution to overall GDP has steadily declined. In 2005, agriculture accounted for less than 13 
percent of GDP, compared to nearly 30 percent in 1980 (NBS 2006). The decline of agriculture in the 
domestic economy is due primarily to the weak performance of the sector as well as stronger growth 
elsewhere in the economy (i.e., the industrial and service sectors). The annual growth rate of agricultural 
GDP since 1996 was only 3.5 percent, slightly higher than the 2.7 percent growth seen in the pre-reform 
era. In contrast, the industrial and service sectors have each registered higher growth rates of about 8-10 
percent during the same period (Table 1).  4 
 
Table 1. Annual growth rates of China’s economy, 1970-2005 (percent) 
 Pre-reform 
Period  Reform Period 
  1970-78 1979-84 1985-95 1996-00 2001-05 
Overall  GDP  4.9 8.8 9.7 8.2 8.7 
    Agriculture  2.7  7.1  4.0  3.4  3.5 
    Industry  6.8  8.2  12.8  9.6  10.6 
    Service  N/A  11.6  9.7  8.3  8.3 
Source: NBS various years 
Within the agricultural sector, crop production accounted for 51 percent of total agricultural 
output, while livestock contributed 35 percent, and fisheries 10 percent in 2005 (NBS 2006). While grain 
remains the key crop, its growth rate has steadily declined in the past two decades, due primarily to the 
changing incentive structure that favors production of crops other than grains as well as non-crop 
products (Table 2). In particular, oil crops, fruits and vegetables, meats and fishery products have 
experienced higher growth rates than other production categories. 
The changing pattern of agricultural production first reflects government policies that encourage 
diversification. These polices include progressive relaxation of the grain procurement quota system and, 
more recently, removal of tax on all agricultural specialty products except tobacco leaf. Correspondingly, 
farmers have switched production from grains to other more profitable agricultural products, such as fruit 
and vegetables. These adjustments are also in response to emerging export opportunities and to changes in 
domestic demand as a result of rising income and urbanization. The structural change in production has 
led to a reallocation of resources to areas that are more in line with China’s comparative advantage, as 
fruit and vegetables, meats and fish (aquaculture) are labor-intensive products whereas grain is land-
intensive. Restructuring also occurred within grain production, with land sown to rice and wheat declining 
but that sown to maize increasing. This reflects a shift in maize use from food to feed in order to meet 
increasing consumption demand for livestock products.  
Table 2. Agricultural production annual growth rates, 1970-2005 (percent) 
  1970-78 1979-84 1985-95 1996-00 2001-05 
Grain Production  2.8 4.7 1.7  0.03  -0.2 
   Rice  2.5  4.5  0.6  0.3  -0.9 
   Wheat  7.0  8.3  1.9  -0.4  -1.9 
   Maize  7.4  3.7  4.7  -0.1  5.5 
Other Production       
   Cotton  -0.4  19.3 -0.3 -1.9  6.5 
   Soybean  -2.3  5.2  2.8  2.6  2.4 
   Oil Crops  2.1  14.9  4.4  5.6  0.6 
   Fruits & Vegetables  6.6  7.2  12.7  8.6  29.5 
   Meats  4.4  9.1  8.8  6.5  4.6 
   Fishery  5.0  7.9  13.7  10.2  3.5 
Source: NBS various years 
China is a major player in world agricultural markets. Although the contribution of agriculture to 
China’s overall trade flows has declined, the values of agricultural imports and exports have steadily 
increased. In 2005, the total value of Chinese agricultural trade reached US$43.5 billion (import plus 
export), an increase of US$16.9 billion from 2001 (Figure 3). Exports and imports of agricultural 
products were US$15.9 billion and US$27.6 billion, respectively, in 2005, resulting in a record high 
agricultural trade deficit of US$11.7 billion. In fact, with the exception of 1993, China has been a net food 
importer since 1990. The rise of agricultural trade deficits in recent years is due primarily to a dramatic 
increase in domestic demand for cereals (mainly wheat), oilseeds (mainly soybeans), cotton and sugar. In 5 
 
the export sector, fruits, vegetables, meats and fishery products have performed strongly in the past 
decade. However, these products are also the ones that have suffered substantially from foreign sanitary 
and phytosanitary barriers (Cheng and Tang 2007).  
Adjustments in China’s trade policy, including tariff reduction policies, have significantly 
changed China’s agricultural export and import structure. Similar to its production pattern, agricultural 
trade in China has also moved in a direction that is more consistent with its comparative advantage, as 
argued by Hayes and Fuller (1999). For example, the proportion of grain exports fell to 20 percent of total 
agricultural exports in the 1990s, from more than 40 percent in the 1980s (Huang and Rozelle 2002). 
Horticultural, animal, and aquatic products accounted for more than 80 percent of agricultural exports in 
the late 1990s. By regrouping trade data according to factor intensity in production, Huang and Rozelle 
concluded that China’s net exports of land-intensive bulk commodities, such as grains, oilseeds, and sugar 
crops, have fallen, while exports of high value and more labor-intensive commodities have risen. Similar 
trade patterns have also been observed in an earlier study by Carter and Li (1999).  
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3.  RECENT AGRICULTURAL POLICY  
3.1. Need for Continued Agricultural Policy Reform 
The Chinese economy has long been characterized by discrimination against agriculture arising from 
government policies, many of which can be dated back to pre-socialist times (Huang et al. 2007). The 
government either taxed agriculture explicitly or set commodity prices below market levels, creating 
disincentives to agricultural production. Monopoly parastatal marketing firms (e.g., state owned grain 
enterprises) fully controlled the distribution of agricultural commodities and, through pan-territorial and 
pan-seasonal agricultural pricing, served mainly the interests of a select group composed of the urban 
elite, the industrial sector, and government bureaucrats. By the 1970s, evidence had mounted that 
government interventions in agriculture had done more harm than good to the economy. Poor economic 
performance, a stagnating agricultural sector and intensifying political pressure forced the country to 
accept much-needed agricultural policy reforms within the broader context of economic reforms that 
started in 1978.  
Because of the importance of agriculture in the domestic economy in terms of income generation 
and employment, agricultural reforms occupied a central place in the initial reform efforts. The 
agricultural reform measures were generally designed to correct previous biases against agriculture by 
reducing or eliminating price controls and parastatal marketing (Ke 2007). The expectation was that 
improving price incentives for farmers and reducing government intervention in the agricultural sector 
would generate a sizable supply response and promote the rapid emergence of well-functioning markets. 
The reforms, in general, have been successful, not least because of a sincere government commitment to 
market liberalization. Agricultural output rose substantially and there was an increase in competition and 
private trader entry into domestic and foreign agricultural markets. Greater competition and increasingly 
cost-effective private-sector trading led to lower marketing margins and improved market efficiency. As a 
result, farmers received a greater share of the rising retail and export prices. 
Evidence also emerged, however, that reforms had not succeeded in other areas. In particular, 
they failed to properly transfer structural and institutional functions previously performed by the state to 
the private sector (Huang 1998). In some cases, parastatal firms continued to dominate the markets (grain 
markets in particular), while in others, government withdrawal had left a vacuum that could not be filled 
by the private sector (e.g., the provision of public goods). Deficiencies in research, extension, 
transportation, storage and communications infrastructure, as well as inadequate legal and other 
regulatory institutions dealing with contract enforcement, quality control, and property rights, caused high 
transaction costs that dampened the efficiency gains from better private entry and competition. Operations 
in agriculture remained informal and small-scale. 
The absence of comprehensive reforms kept many urban-biased policies intact (OECD 2005). 
The legacy of an industry-oriented development strategy, aimed at promoting industrial growth within 
cities, continued to suppress the agricultural sector. A set of biased fiscal and monetary policies that 
favored urban residents (e.g., agricultural taxes and urban subsidies), combined with a flawed sectoral and 
regional development policies focusing on coastal areas), caused urban-rural income disparity to rise 
substantially. The continuation of a household registration system that limits labor mobility aggravated 
the impacts of both sector- and region-biased policies on spatial income disparity.  
There was evidence that reforms had caused an increase in price volatility, resulting in high costs 
paid by vulnerable rural households to limit their exposure to risks and to absorb the consequences of 
risks. Further integration with world agricultural markets has made this effect more pronounced, leading 
to a dilemma in regard to agricultural policy goals, namely, market liberalization versus food security. 
The conflict between these policy goals arises from the difficulty of implementing interventionist 
government policies when the incentives for individual actors are determined by market forces (Solot 
2006). Experiences in the 1990s showed that liberalization was associated with sharp price swings for 
some of the most important commodities, including rice. This high price variability offset gains from 
increases in producer prices and deteriorated investment incentives for farmers. On the demand side, the 
elimination of government purchase and pricing, which is equivalent to removing a price floor, often 7 
 
amidst rising price volatility, typically had adverse impacts on income, food consumption and nutritional 
status, especially for poor smallholder farmers who were net food purchasers. As a result, the impacts of 
reforms on rural welfare in general are uncertain. 
Faced with a new set of agricultural problems, the Chinese government has increasingly 
recognized that further progress in developing the agricultural sector will require not only further 
liberalization, but also a more concerted effort to go beyond the withdrawal of the public sector from 
agricultural markets. The government has perceived the need to assume a new, supportive role for 
agriculture both as a market facilitator and as a producer subsidizer. One aspect of this role is to 
strengthen investment in public goods such as infrastructure, research and extension, and market 
information, which are deemed necessary for the development of more competitive and efficient markets 
(Fan and Thorat 2007). A second aspect is to foster stronger government support for agriculture through 
pricing, marketing, trade and various transfer mechanisms to secure farm income. Consistent with these 
new roles, China has in recent years started a new wave of agricultural policy reforms and introduced a 
series of policy measures that directly favor the agricultural sector.  
3.2. Trade Policies 
China’s foreign trade policy reforms have involved four key steps: lowering trade barriers, depreciating 
the exchange rate, decentralizing the trading system, and introducing competition into foreign trade so 
that prices can play a role in determining resource allocation (Martin 2003). China’s agricultural trade 
policies—as part of an agricultural policy stance intended to maintain self-sufficiency in agricultural 
supply, especially in food grain production—have moved more slowly than other sectors in removing 
restrictions and reducing protection. Notwithstanding periodic standstills and reversals, China has 
progressively liberalized agricultural trade. In its WTO accession protocol, China has agreed to phase out 
state trading, bind 100 percent of its tariff lines, replace quantitative restrictions with a TRQ system, and 
eliminate export subsidies for all agricultural products.  
Applied tariff rates on agricultural products, which are higher than non-agricultural tariff rates, 
fell from 23.1 percent in 2001 to 15.3 percent in 2005, as compared to the overall average applied rate of 
9.7 percent in 2005 (Table 3). Tariff dispersion has also declined, from 0-121.6 percent in 2001 to 0-65 
percent in 2005. Tariffs on dairy products dropped from 35.9 percent in 2001 to 12.1 percent in 2005. 
Tariffs on grain and oilseeds have also fallen substantially since 2001, from 51.9 to 33.9 percent and from 
32.0 to 11.1 percent, respectively. Nevertheless, grain, and other agricultural commodities that have 
traditionally been highly protected, such as sugar and confectionary sugar (29.9 percent in 2005) and 
tobacco (25.4 percent in 2005), are still subject to higher than average tariffs. Some of the lowest tariffs 
apply to oilseeds, a sector that was previously highly protected. With the exception of oilseeds, it appears 
that lower tariffs apply to subsectors in which China apparently has a comparative advantage (i.e. labor-
intensive farm products), such as horticultural and animal products.  
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) have been gradually increased and out-of-quota tariff rates reduced 
(Table 4). In 2006, China eliminated the TRQs on vegetable oils, reducing the number of quota-related 
agricultural tariff lines to 55. The impacts of changing TRQs on trade flows, however, have been limited, 
at least for the short period examined. This is because in-quota imports are usually low and most TRQs 
are unfilled. Imports of grain under TRQs have been especially low, with the exception of wheat in 2004. 
Since 2003, imports of cotton have exceeded the quota levels specified in China’s Accession Protocol. 
However, out-of-quota cotton imports were charged the in-quota tariff rate, which is equivalent to an 
expansion of quota levels. 8 
 
Table 3. China’s applied most favored nation tariff, 2001-2005 (percent) 
  2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 
  Average Range Average Range Average Range Average  Range Average Range 
Agricultural products  23.1 0-121.6  18.2  0-71  16.8  0-68 15.5  0-65 15.3 0-65 
Live animals and 
products thereof 
17.9    0-41  15.2  0-33  14.4  0-29  13.7  0-25  13.7 
 
0-25 
Dairy products  35.9    6-44  24.5  6-32  19.3  6-26  13.8  6-20  12.1  6-20 
Coffee and tea, cocoa, 
sugar, etc. 
30.5 0-114 24.2  0-71  22.3  0-68 20.3  0-65  20.2  0-65 
Cut flowers and plants  10.7     0-36  9.4  0-24  9.0  0-23  8.6  0-23  8.6  0-23 
Fruit and vegetables  20.9     0-42  18.1  0-36  16.9  0-33  16.0  0-30  16.0  0-30 
Grains 51.9  0-114  37.3  0-71  35.6  0-68  33.9  0-65  33.9  0-65 
Oil seeds, fats, oils and 
their products 
32.0 0-121.6  15.9 0-52.4  13.9 0-41.6 12.2  0-30.7 11.1  0-30 
Beverages and spirits  44.4  10-65  32.1  7.5-65 27.5  7.5-65 22.3  0-65  20.3  0-65 




14.5 0-90  13.1  0-54.4  12.8  0-47.2  12.5  0-40  12.4  0-40 
Non-agricultural 
products 
14.4 0-90  11.2  0-51  10.1  0-50  9.3 0-50  8.8  0-50 
Total  15.6 0-121.6  12.2  0-71  11.0  0-68 10.2  0-65  9.7  0-65 
Source: WTO, 2006  
Note 1: n.e.s.: Not Elsewhere Specified 
The role of state-trading enterprises (STEs) in agricultural trade has diminished even though the 
government still retains some influence on imports and exports of key commodities. Agricultural imports 
now subject to state trading include maize, rice, wheat, vegetable oil, sugar, tobacco, and cotton. STEs 
also control exports of maize, rice, cotton, silk, and tobacco. The TRQ system mentioned above specifies 
criteria for allocating import quotas between STEs and private enterprises. Since 2001, the in-quota shares 
of STEs have decreased substantially for vegetable oils (palm, rapeseed, and soybean), which corresponds 
to a relaxation of the TRQs on these products. In contrast, the shares of STEs for imports of maize, 
cotton, rice, sugar, and wheat have been kept relatively high and fixed. Export quotas are exclusively 
controlled by the STEs. The continued use of state trading in the import and export of these “strategically 
important” commodities presumably allows the government to stabilize supply and price in the domestic 
market.  
Since the end of 2007, China has introduced several new agricultural trade policies in response to 
pressure from high inflation, particularly rising commodity prices, and declining production worldwide. 
For instance, in early 2008, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced a temporary quota 
policy for the export of wheat, maize and rice powder in order to guarantee an adequate domestic supply. 
The details of the quota are unspecified, but it will be implemented through a permit policy (MOFCOM 
2008). In addition, China’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) announced in late 2007 that China would 
eliminate export tax rebates (12 percent) on grains and processed grain products (MOF 2007a), and start 
levying export taxes on these products in the range of 5-25 percent (MOF 2008a). According to the MOF, 
China will further lower import tariffs for major agricultural products in 2008. The tariff for soybeans was 
temporarily reduced from 3 percent to 1 percent in October 2007 and the reduced rate will continue to be 
effective through the end of September 2008 (MOF 2008b).   9 
 
Table 4. China’s TRQs for agricultural products, 2002-2005  
   2002 2003 2004 2005 
Wheat  Quota level ('000 tons)  8,468.0 9,052.0 9,636.0 9,636.0 
  Out-of-quota imports ('000 tons)  NA  NA  NA  NA 
  In-quota imports ('000 tons)  632  450  7,260.0  NA 
  State-trading  share  90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 
  In-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  1-10  1-10  1-10  1-10 
  Out-of-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  71.0  68  65  65 
Corn  Quota level ('000 tons)  5,850.0 6,525.0 7,200.0 7,200.0 
  Out-of-quota imports ('000 tons)  NA  NA  NA  NA 
  In-quota imports ('000 tons)  10  <5  <5  NA 
  State-trading  share  68.0 64.0 60.0 60.0 
  In-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  1-10  1-10  1-10  1-10 
  Out-of-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  28-71  24-68  20-65  20-65 
Rice  Quota level ('000 tons)  3,990.0 4,655.0 5,320.0 4,767.0 
  Out-of-quota imports ('000 tons)  NA  NA  NA  NA 
  In-quota imports ('000 tons)  237  260  770  NA 
  State-trading  share  50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 
  In-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  1-9  1-9  1-9  1-9 
  Out-of-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  22-71  16-68  10-65  10-65 
Soybean oil  Quota level ('000 tons) 2,518.0  2,818.0 3,587.1 3,587.0 
  Out-of-quota imports ('000 tons)  NA  NA  NA  NA 
  In-quota imports ('000 tons)  870  1,880  2,520  NA 
  State-trading  share  34.0 26.0 18.0 10.0 
  In-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  9.0  9  9.0  9.0 
  Out-of-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  52.4  41.6  30.7  19.9 
Palm oil  Quota level ('000 tons) 2,400.0  2,600.0  3,168.0  NA 
  Out-of-quota imports ('000 tons)  NA  NA  NA  NA 
  In-quota imports ('000 tons)  1,695  2,330  2,390  NA 
  State-trading  share  NA NA NA NA 
  In-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  9.0  9  9.0  9.0 
  Out-of-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  52.4  41.6  30.7  19.9 
Rape seed oil  Quota level ('000  tons)  878.9 1,018.6 1,243.0 1,243.0 
  Out-of-quota imports ('000 tons)  NA  NA  NA  NA 
  In-quota imports ('000 tons)  78  150  350  NA 
  State-trading  share  34.0 26.0 18.0 10.0 
  In-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  9.0  9.0  9.0  9.0 
  Out-of-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  52.4  41.6  30.7  19.9 
Sugar  Quota level ('000 tons)  1,764.0 1,852.0 1,945.0 1,945.0 
  Out-of-quota imports ('000 tons)  NA  NA  NA  NA 
  In-quota imports ('000 tons)  1,183  780  1,210  NA 
  State-trading  share  70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 
  In-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  20.0  20.0  15.0  15.0 
  Out-of-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  65.9  58.0  50.0  50.0 
Cotton  Quota level ('000 tons)





  Out-of-quota imports ('000 tons)  NA  NA  NA  NA 
  In-quota imports ('000 tons)  177  870  1,910  NA 
  State-trading  share  33.0 33.0 33.0 33.0 
  In-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
  Out-of-quota MFN tariff rate (%)  54.4  47.2  40.0  40.0 
Source: WTO, 2006.  
Note: 1. Quota levels for cotton were increased during 2003-2005; NA – Not Available 10 
 
3.3. Domestic Policies  
The post-WTO accession domestic agricultural policy regime in China was characterized by the 
relaxation of price and marketing controls, the expansion of government subsidies and investments, and 
the elimination of agricultural taxes. Following the liberalization of non-strategic agricultural products 
including fruits, vegetables, livestock and fish in the 1980s and “important reserved materials” including 
cotton, vegetable oil, and sugar in the late 1990s and early 2000s, price and marketing controls were kept 
only for grain and tobacco. According to China’s WTO accession protocol, tobacco was subject to “state 
pricing” and grains to “government guidance pricing.” At present, China’s tobacco industry remains a 
state monopoly, with rigid control of production, price, marketing and trade. In contrast, government 
intervention in grain has been gradually minimized.  
Prior to 1997, Chinese farmers were required to deliver a fixed amount (quota) of grain at a 
procurement price (quota price). Farmers could sell surplus output either to the grain bureaus at a 
negotiated price or directly to the market; hence there existed a parallel free market price along with the 
government price. In 1998, the state procurement quota system was dismantled and farmers were allowed 
to sell any amount voluntarily to the state-owned grain bureaus at a pre-set protective price. Selling to 
individuals or private firms was no longer permitted. The protective price scheme was gradually 
eliminated in the years that followed, but in order to give farmers an incentive to continue growing grains, 
a minimum price was set, initially for rice in 2004 and then extended to wheat in 2005. In 2006 and 2007, 
the minimum price for rice was set at RMB1400-1500/ton while that for wheat was RMB1380-1440/ton. 
These prices were increased in 2008 to RMB1540-1640/ton and 1440-1540/ton for rice and wheat, 
respectively. Relaxation of grain price controls was accompanied by changing functionality of the grain 
bureaus, which until the mid-1980s had dominated upstream and downstream distribution of agricultural 
products. Currently, the grain bureaus are largely decentralized and commercialized, with their roles 
largely restricted to the provision of information and the maintenance of strategic stocks (with the 
exception of tobacco). Private grain users (e.g., grain processors, feed manufacturers) and traders are 
generally allowed to enter the marketing channel.   
In recent years, China has strengthened its support for agriculture by subsidizing agricultural 
inputs, including machinery, fertilizers, pesticides, electricity, fuels, water, and transportation. Charges 
for such inputs as fuels, water, electricity and transport tend to be lower for farmers, but the level of 
subsidy is difficult to assess as the cost of provision is different across various users. For instance, to 
lower prices of fertilizers, fertilizer producers have been given access to lower priced inputs, such as 
electricity. In addition, export taxes, temporary exemptions from Value-added Tax (VAT) and caps on 
sales prices are occasionally used to curb rises in fertilizer prices. In 2002, the government introduced a 
subsidy for farmers purchasing improved quality soy seed (through lower prices). In 2004 and 2005, this 
scheme was extended to include subsidies for purchasing improved seed for production of wheat, corn 
and rice, as well as soybeans. Annual seed subsidies reached RMB2.85 and 3.87 billion in 2004 and 2005, 
respectively (MOA 2006). The government also provides a small subsidy for the purchase of farm 
machinery (RMB0.07 and 0.3 billion in 2004 and 2005, respectively). 
China has recently experimented with direct payment policies. Direct payment tied to grain 
acreage was put in place in 2002 in selected major grain-producing provinces: Anhui, Henan, Hubei, and 
Jilin (Gale, Lohmar, and Tuan 2005). China introduced its first nationwide direct payments to farmers in 
2004. In 2005, the program covered 30 provinces. The payment rates vary across provinces, but on 
average they were RMB10 per mu (1/15 hectare) in 2004 and since then have increased to RMB12-14 per 
mu in 2007. The total grain direct payments reached RMB11.6 and 13.2 billion in 2004 and 2005, 
respectively, according to China’s Ministry of Finance. In 2006, direct payments were RMB14.2 billion, 
an increase of 8 percent over the 2005 level. According to Chinese authorities, direct payments to farmers 
will be continued and strengthened in the coming years (MOF 2007b).  
In line with the move to help farmers, China has either eliminated or reduced various taxes on 
agriculture.
2 The tax on specialty crops (except for tobacco) was first removed, resulting in a RMB9 
                                                      
2 Besides taxes, China also eliminated a myriad of fees levied on farmers to fund road construction, schools, and various 
other projects and services undertaken by village and township authorities (Gale, Lohmar, and Tuan 2005). 11 
 
billion benefit to farmers in 2004. After two years of phasing-in, the government completely abolished the 
agricultural tax at the beginning of 2006. When the reductions in these two taxes are combined, the total 
annual tax savings for farmers in 2004 and 2005 were RMB18.2 and 18.3 billion, respectively (MOA 
2006). It should be noted, however, that taxes on agriculture as a whole have increased in the two years 
when tax reforms occurred. This is due to increases in contract tax and tax on the use of cultivated land, 
which have very limited impacts on farmers.
3 Therefore, exemption from various agricultural taxes has 
effectively reduced the amount farmers would otherwise have to pay and the absolute tax burden on 
farmers has been alleviated.    
Investment in agriculture-related projects is a major instrument for China to achieve rural 
development targets and is by far the largest component in government budgetary support for agriculture. 
Projects include spending on production infrastructure, such as improved irrigation facilities, rural 
hydroelectric plants, pasture enclosures, research, and construction of agricultural high-technology parks. 
China also boosts farm investment through a system of 35,000 rural credit cooperatives and state-owned 
commercial and policy banks (e.g., the Agricultural Bank of China and the Agricultural Development 
Bank of China). These financial institutions have provided preferential loans to rural areas.  
 
                                                      
3 Both taxes are related to the conversion of cultivated land to non-agricultural usage. 12 
 
4.  PAST AND SHADOW WTO NOTIFICATIONS  
4.1. China’s Domestic Support and WTO Commitments 
The increasing importance of agricultural subsidies in China in recent years raises the question of whether 
China has complied with its WTO commitments on domestic support for agriculture. Compliance, or lack 
thereof, can be monitored or challenged. With this purpose, the Uruguay Round established a Committee 
on Agriculture and assigned it the duty of reviewing progress in the implementation of individual 
member’s commitments. Each WTO member is required to abide by their commitments and to provide 
notifications of their implementation status. In principle, these notifications are intended to provide some 
transparency about the policy actions of each country. In reality, however, few countries update their 
notifications in a timely fashion. The WTO has no formal method for enforcing such requirements, and as 
a result, delays in submitting notifications frequently occur. Like other Member countries, China’s 
domestic support notifications are long overdue. The most recent China notification was for 1999-2001, 
and was not submitted until January 10, 2006 (G/AG/N/CHN/8).  
Given the dearth of official notification reports, and the resulting controversies regarding the 
actions of individual countries, estimates of the subsidy situation are needed to better inform national and 
international agricultural policy debates. Table 5 provides a summary of China’s domestic support from 
1996-2005 (the set of WTO style domestic support tables are reported in Appendix A). Data for 1996-
2001 are drawn from China’s two official notifications to the WTO (WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3 and 
G/AG/N/CHN/8). These data are supplemented with our “shadow” calculations drawing on more recent 
data and taking into account changes in policy. All calculations of the support levels utilize the methods 
laid out in the two above mentioned official notifications.
4 Based on the support estimates in Table 5, a 
general answer to the above question is that, in the absence of successful challenges to China’s 
notifications, the country’s domestic support for this period has been well below the limits agreed at its 
WTO accession. However, there are a number of interesting features that warrant further examination.  
First, green box support has increased in China as a result of increased public investment in the 
agricultural sector. In 2005, total green box support reached RMB289 billion, which is more than twice 
the 1996 figure (RMB112 billion). The AoA placed no limits on green box subsidies, which are 
considered not to directly distort trade. These subsidies generally include government-supported general 
services such as research, disease control, training, extension, inspection, infrastructure and marketing. 
The green box category also includes expenditures on public stockholding for food security purposes, 
income-support payments made directly to farmers that do not stimulate production, assistance to help 
farmers restructure agriculture, and environmental and regional assistance programs.
5  
Within China’s green box, infrastructure services (a major part of general services) and public 
stockholding for food security purposes are the two largest components. Together they account for 70-80 
percent of total green box payments. Domestic food aid has dropped sharply while expenses on general 
agricultural services and environmental programs have increased. China has made no payments for 
marketing and promotional services, income insurance and income safety-net programs, or structural 
adjustment assistance, but since 2004 has provided decoupled income support to farmers. In the future, 
China will likely use green box subsidies to further strengthen direct payments to farmers, improve 
infrastructure and research, develop new grain varieties and technologies, address water shortages, and 
adjust agricultural production structures. However, spending on these programs will also be constrained 
by availability of funds. 
 
                                                      
4 Using our own data source, we are able to replicate historical support levels as reported in official notifications. 
5 Recent direct payments to farmers (2004 and 2005) are classified as a green box measure in this calculation. Seed subsidies 
are product-specific support while other input subsidies (e.g., farm machinery, fertilizers) are non-product-specific support.   13 
 
Table 5. China’s domestic support, 1996-2005 (million RMB) 
Policy  Category  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Green Box 
1            
      Total  112,178 131,254 210,815 184,335 207,899 242,331 215,696 247,361 291,312 289,358 
      S e l e c t e d   C a t e g o r i e s             
            General  Services    66,648  74,542 135,949 109,110 121,230 145,045 115,284 124,829 140,616 137,021 
      Public Stockholding  28,773  35,335  51,027 47,596 53,799 59,685 48,172 52,264 62,079 53,746 
      Domestic Food Aid  2,012  1,875  1,766  2,640  2,360  683  160  128  128  93 
      Environmental Programs  4,954  5,460  5,620  7,097 12,700 17,475 33,346 46,862 51,994 55,386 
            
P r o d u c t - S p e c i f i c   S u p p o r t               
   Market Price Support 
2  -34,980 -22,053 -18,622 -99,354 -97,159 -77,867 -65,152 -50,207 -42,986 -57,017 
   Other PS Support 
3  0  0  0 2,854 3,503 1,790  0  330 2,850 3,870 
   Total (before de minimis)  -34,980 -22,053 -18,622 -96,500 -93,656 -76,077 -65,152 -49,877 -40,136 -53,147 
   Total (after de minimis)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
            
Non-Product-Specific  Support            
   Total (before de minimis)  28,027 26,059 34,122  700  745  748 10,391  6,370 15,739 45,364 
   Total (after de minimis)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
            
8.5% of Value of Production 
4  166,258 175,640 180,562 186,916 188,727 198,599 198,783 207,476 257,653 279,855 
            
Current  Total  AMS    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: 1. Green box includes direct payments made in 2004 and 2005.  
          2. In calculating the Market Price Support, actual border prices and fixed, 1996-1998 average border prices are used for 1996-1998 and 1999-2005, respectively.   
          3. According to official notifications, other PS support was provided to cotton through interest subsidies for national cotton stockholdings during 1999-2001. From 2003-
2005, this support included seed subsidies.  
          4. Value of production is based on producer prices. 14 
 
Second, China has a zero current total aggregate measure of support (AMS) during the period 
examined. Since no total AMS commitment exists in Part IV of China’s Schedule, the country can only 
provide support to agricultural producers up to the relevant de minimis level. The de minimis exemption 
on the AMS provided to a developing country member is generally set at 10 percent of the member’s 
value of production (VOP), product-wise for product-specific (PS) support or in total for non-product-
specific (NPS) support. In the case of China, this exemption is 8.5 percent as specified in its WTO 
accession agreement. Any subsidy amount over this de minimis limit would be considered a violation of 
China’s WTO commitments. It seems, however, that to date neither the PS de minimis nor the NPS de 
minimis has imposed real constraints on domestic support measures in China because of the large value of 
agricultural production. 
Although China’s subsidy level is far from the binding level by the de minimis, setting the 
percentage de minimis level was a major hurdle in the final phase of China’s WTO membership 
negotiations. Both sides, China and its negotiating counterparts led by US delegates, struggled to resolve 
their differences. The disputes, in retrospect, were more procedural rather than substantive, as the de 
minimis level has never been exceeded either by PS support or by NPS support in the historical period. In 
fact, when strictly calculated using the WTO definition and methodology (e.g.,  fixed reference prices at 
1996-1998), the domestic support level has been far below zero for PS support (before de minimis) as a 
result of a large, negative Market Price Support (MPS). For NPS support, given China’s enormous 
agricultural sector, there is little chance that this type of support can surpass 8.5 percent of the total value 
of agricultural production. During 1996-2005, NPS support (before de minimis), consisting of input and 
interest subsidies, accounted for an average of only 1 percent of the total value of production. Given a 
total agricultural production of RMB3,300 billion in 2005, China can potentially pay trade-distorting 
subsidies up to a maximum of RMB561 billion (PS and NPS de minimis combined). Thus there appears 
to be substantial room for China to extend its amber box subsidy measures. Like the US, China may 
become a heavy user of de minimis provisions to shield subsidies from being cut back.  
Third, China has given up the right as a developing country to use “special and differential 
treatment” (as provided in Article 6.2 of the AoA) to report subsidy measures that are exempt from the 
reduction commitments. This is in contrast to many other developing country members which have 
reported in this category subsidies that are claimed to be “development programs” and targeted at “low-
income or resource poor farmers.”
6 In its accession documents, China recognized the need to provide 
support of this type. However, it decided to include the amount of the support in the calculation of the 
AMS, effectively sealing off its own right under the AoA to introduce exempt S&D subsidies on 
agriculture in the future should this be judged necessary in order to protect the livelihoods of poor farmers 
or to achieve development priorities. This, the 8.5 percent de minimis and other commitments are 
accompanied by compromises China accepted in return for its WTO membership, which reflect both 
WTO+ and WTO- at work (Evenett and Braga 2005).
7 In recent acceding countries including China have 
clearly negotiated with existing members. 
Like other Member countries, China is eligible to use blue box payments (e.g., those that are 
associated with production limitation criteria). At present there is no cap on spending in this box. In 
China’s official notifications and our replication, the blue box is zero, meaning that China has not 
provided such subsidies. However, should future support paid in the current forms approach or even 
exceed the exemption ceilings in the amber box (i.e., the de minimis), China may have to redesign its 
support programs to make them comply with these limits. One way of doing so without cutting spending 
is to switch from amber box trade/production-distorting support instruments to less distorting blue box 
payments (or decoupled instruments which can be classified as green box payments).  
                                                      
6 There is no indication on how low-income or resource-poor farmers are defined in the AoA, which gives countries some 
flexibility in notifying these measures.  
7 WTO+ stands for additional commitments that go beyond the ones agreed to by the incumbent countries (WTO+ 
commitments) and WTO– denotes forgone rights available to other WTO members (WTO– rights). 15 
 
4.2. Problems with Market Price Support 
In calculating the MPS, several issues arise in the official and shadow notifications. First, the level of 
MPS is based on the gap between the current support price and the fixed, domestic currency denominated 
external reference price (1996-1998 average world prices). This could potentially pose a problem for 
China, where inflation rates have followed a cyclical pattern. For example, between the base years (1996-
1998) and 2002, China experienced mild inflation and even deflation, but from 2003, inflation rates have 
increased, with price rises reaching nearly 20 percent in 2007 for agricultural commodities. Since the base 
reference prices are fixed in domestic currency terms, and if inflation is not accounted for, the MPS 
would also follow a cyclical trend (assuming administered prices correlate with general domestic prices), 
even though government policies may have remained unchanged. This problem, however, can be 
alleviated if the current total AMS is adjusted for inflation according to Article 18.4 of the AoA. 
Second, there is some ambiguity in the AoA regarding whether the quantity eligible to receive the 
administered price is total production, or only the marketed surplus that is actually sold in the market, or 
the quantity that is actually procured by the government through price support mechanisms. Some 
member countries including China have used the quantity procured, whereas other countries (e.g., the US) 
have used total production. The logic of using total production in these computations is that the 
government-designated agency is bound to buy whatever is brought to the market at the pre-announced 
support price. This is also the requirement made clear in China’s protective price policy for grains.
8 
However, there is a limit on this because the quantity brought to the market will not be more than the 
marketable surplus, given that self-consumption accounts for a very large share of the output of basic 
foodstuffs in a country like China. In addition, budget constraints preclude the possibility of unlimited 
purchases. 
Third, the MPS double counts the protection afforded by border measures. The AoA requires 
each country to identify products with “administered prices” which should be included in the calculation 
of the MPS. In some cases, the administered prices are in addition to any import barriers or export 
subsidies that are already in place to keep domestic prices high. For example, China reports administered 
price support for grain products. However, the grain price support schemes are sometimes inoperative 
(except for the mandatory procurement portion) as in some years market prices have been well above 
support prices because of border measures. The conflation of domestic support and border protection can 
be described by referring to the formula that defines MPS:  
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where the official and base prices are not necessarily equal to the actual domestic and world market 
prices, respectively. If there is no difference between actual and formula prices, then the gap measured is 
the actual border protection and hence is double counted by the MPS (de Gorter  and Ingco 2002). 
Because of the scope for double counting of the MPS, China could potentially limit its AMS by 
eliminating price support programs while retaining high tariffs or strict TRQ protection, a loop-hole 
already used by other nations. This calls for a reform of the strategies for domestic support reduction such 
as the design of a “flashing” amber box, as argued by de Gorter and Ingco (2002).  
Finally, the officially reported MPS can mis-count actual price support for commodities. If we 
define:  
                                                      
8 For example, in the State Council’s “Decision on Deepening the Reform of the Grain Circulation System,” the government 




actual actual actual MPS P P Q =−∗ , then 
Over(under) Counting official actual MPS MPS =− . 
Over- or under-counting can occur due to changes in the official domestic support price, the actual world 
price, the domestic actual market price, and the exchange rate. If 
dd
actual official PP =  and  
()
ww
actual base PP >< , then actual support has declined (risen) and so the  official MPS  overcounts 
(undercounts). If 
ww
actual base PP =  and  ()
dd
actual official PP <> , then actual support has declined (risen) and so the 
official MPS  overcounts (undercounts).  
Table 6 compares estimates of MPS based on different definitions of eligible production and 
reference prices with the administered price being the relevant domestic price. As can be seen, the 
calculation based on total production amplifies the price support measure as compared to that using actual 
quantity purchased. In the official notifications, China has selected smaller actual purchases in the 
calculation of the MPS, which, in reality, gives China more flexibility in expanding its price support. The 
effect of different interpretation of eligible production on China’s AMS and WTO commitment 
compliances, however, is negligible because the MPS is negative and PS de minimis support is zero in 
both cases.
9  But it will become more important when administered prices rise and the MPS moves to 
positive territory.  
Table 6 also shows that the use of actual world reference prices indicates more protection (or less 
disprotection) and the officially reported MPS undercounts (negative miscounting). This occurs because 
of the weaker world prices relative to those in the base period (1996-1998). The impact of low world 
reference prices is particularly evident in 2002 and 2003 when the MPS based on actual reference price 
became positive whereas those based on fixed base reference price were negative. The MPS based on 
actual reference price subsequently turned negative in 2004 and 2005 following the sharp increase in 
world commodity prices. 
Table 6. MPS under different assumptions (million RMB) 
  Market Price Support 
  Actual Purchase  Total Production 












1999 -99,354  -32,949  -66,405  -384,650  -165,073  -219,577 
2000 -97,159  -11,251  -85,908  -367,050  -58,686  -308,364 
2001 -77,867  -4,605  -73,262  -358,527  -24,889  -333,638 
2002 -65,153  6,230  -71,383  -295,141  36,387  -331,528 
2003 -50,207  6,427  -56,634  -225,202  40,057  -265,259 
2004 -42,986  -17,455  -25,531  -281,263  -122,490  -158,773 
2005 -57,017  -16,049  -40,968  -297,491  -108,513  -188,978 
Source: Author’s calculation 
The reference period of 1996-1998 for China differs from that of most other WTO members 
whose baseline is set for 1986-1988, a period of exceptionally low world prices. For the latter group, 
world prices in the implementation period (1995-2000) were higher than the baseline values, and hence 
the countries faced higher MPS and difficulty in AMS reductions. For China, by contrast, the higher base 
reference price and an undervalued exchange rate for converting world prices into domestic currency 
terms have meant that China has had much smaller MPS (consistently negative during the period under 
                                                      
9 The application of total production instead of actual procured amount in the MPS calculation for the base period may 
change a country’s initial AMS commitments. However this would not affect China because of the negative MPS and the 
resulting zero current total AMS estimated for the base period.  17 
 
examination) and thus less difficulty in containing its AMS under its commitments. On the other hand, if 
world commodity prices were to resume their secular decline over time, the implied support from 
administered price (along with consumer transfers and border protection) will increase, even though the 
measured support in the AMS will not. This may have implications for the effectiveness of China’s WTO 
commitments.  
Continued appreciation of the Chinese currency would add to this problem. Between 2005 and 
2007, the Chinese RMB nominal exchange rate appreciated 12 percent against the US dollar and is 
expected to revalue even further (Goldstein 2007). The literature has suggested an undervaluation of the 
currency still in the range of 20 percent or more (Cheng and Orden 2007; Frankel 2006). Were the 
appreciation trend to continue, it would make the actual MPS (based on the prevailing exchange rate and 
world reference prices) diverge further from the notified MPS (calculated using the exchange rate and 
world reference prices in the base period). The magnitude of the difference will depend on how actual 
world reference prices and the exchange rate change and the degree to which exchange rate fluctuations 
pass through to domestic and administered prices.  
4.3. The Nature of Direct Payments 
Controversies may arise from different interpretations of the subsidy policies and their classification in a 
WTO notification. Alternative subsidy definitions could affect the calculated levels of support and make 
otherwise unbinding commitments become binding. WTO members tend to have incentives not to notify 
or to mis-notify trade-distorting subsidy components because a notification of “amber box” measures 
amounts to an admission that the measures are subject to caps, reductions, and other disciplines. 
Typically, countries choose a notification scheme that best makes them appear compliant with WTO rules 
and then wait to see whether their measures are challenged in dispute settlement. There have been a 
number of complaints against such practices that have been brought to the WTO, mostly in regard to the 
practices of developed countries. For developing countries, non-notification or mis-notification issues 
also exist but are seldom challenged.  
For China, a critical issue is whether its direct payments to farmers meet WTO green box criteria. 
Although our calculation has assumed these payments to be green box measures and therefore exempt, 
which is likely to be the case in future official notifications, it is far from clear whether they should be so 
categorized. According to the AoA, for a program to be classified as green box support, it must not distort 
trade, or at most cause minimal distortion (paragraph 1). The program must be publicly funded, not 
involve transfers from consumers, and not have the effect of providing price support to producers. In 
addition to these fundamental requirements, a program has to meet specific policy criteria, which are 
contained in Annex 2 to the AoA (the green box). 
Specifically, the criteria include: (a) Eligibility for the payments shall be determined by clearly-
defined criteria such as income, status as a producer or landowner, factor use or production level in a 
defined and fixed base period. (b) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, 
or based on, the type or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producer in 
any year after the base period. (c) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, 
or based on, the prices, domestic or international, applying to any production undertaken in any year after 
the base period. (d) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, 
the factors of production employed in any year after the base period. (e) No production shall be required 
in order to receive such payments. If a direct payment program does not meet these criteria, it must be 
reported to the WTO under the amber box (or possibly the blue box).  
It appears that direct payments in China would violate a number of these provisions. Various 
methods have been used in China to provide payments to farmers, ranging from fixed subsidies not tied to 
the current year’s production or marketing to those that are tied to market prices or production. Fixed 
subsidies were based on either historical household deliveries of grain to the government, historical grain 
production from the household’s allocated land based on local tax records, or the actual production or 
marketing of grain. Thus, the fixed subsidies cannot be completely classified as green box measures as 
some of them are likely linked to production. In some provinces, price subsidies were used instead of 18 
 
fixed subsidies. Price subsidies paid farmers the difference between a target price set by the government 
and a market price, which is equivalent to providing price support to farmers. This subsidy resembles two 
PS support components reported in the US WTO notification: “marketing loan benefits” when all outputs 
are eligible or “counter-cyclical payments” when only fixed base acreage  is applicable. Using payment 
rates reported by Gale, Lohmar, and Tuan (2005) for wheat, rice and corn, Table 7 shows the potential 
non-exempt direct payments to farmers of these crops in 2004 and 2005 and the PS support. Because of 
the large negative MPS, the inclusion of these payments does not have an impact on the PS support after 
applying de minimis rules. However, if in the future China strengthens its direct payments and the MPS is 
positive, both of which are likely to occur given the current commodity boom, the PS de minimis will 
become a binding factor. This is shown in the next section.      










(before de minimis) 
8.5% 
 (keep ‘%’)  
of VOP 
PS Support 
(after de minimis) 
  RMB/ton  000’ tons  ---- Million RMB ---- 
2004             
   Wheat  48.0  91,952  4,416  -7,193  -2,777  11,641  0 
   Rice  27.3  179,088  4,893  -26,919  -22,025  24,301  0 
   Corn  17.4  130,287  2,265  -8,874  -6,609  10,997  0 
Total  -- 401,327  11,574  -42,986 -31,411  46,939  0 
2005             
   Wheat  50.5  97,445  4,922  -11,902  -6,980  11,432  0 
   Rice   29.8  180,588  5,383  -32,385  -27,002  23,842  0 
   Corn  20.7  139,365  2,885  -12,729  -9,844  12,154  0 
Total  -- 417,398  13,190  -57,016 -43,826  47,428  0 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: Other non-exempt PS support is not reported.  
The recent WTO panel and Appellate Body ruling in the Brazil/US upland cotton case 
(WT/DS267/R; WT/DS267/AB/R) makes the claim that the direct payments in China are green box 
measures even less convincing. In that case (DS267), Brazil brought a complaint against certain aspects 
of the cotton policies of the United States and a key issue was whether the direct payments provided by 
the US actually have an impact on production. As the payments were conditional on producers not 
planting certain commodities (specifically fruits, vegetables and wild rice) on the land upon which 
payments were based, the panel concluded that the US direct payments do not fully conform to the 
guidelines for green box direct payments. By the same argument, Chinese direct payments would not 
satisfy the green box requirements because farmers have to be current grain producers in order to receive 
the payments.  
Even if direct payments in China can be classified as “decoupled payments” de jure, the question 
of whether they would alter farmers’ planting decisions and stimulate production de facto remains 
controversial. Figure 4 shows the amount of direct payments and grain production in recent years. The 
two series clearly exhibit some correlation after the direct payment scheme was introduced in 2004. So 
far, there have been no studies examining the nature of direct payments in China, partly because of the 
novelty of the policy and partly because of data constraints. However, various studies on decoupled 
payment programs in the US may shed some light on this issue. In general, these studies have presented 
mixed results, with some arguing that the effects of the decoupled payments are negligible (e.g., Burfisher 
and Hopkins 2003) and others showing varying degrees of distortion (e.g., Goodwin and Mishra 2006). 
The mechanisms for production distortion identified in the literature typically include wealth effects that 
impact attitudes towards risks; decisions on leisure and savings; overcoming credit constraints or other 19 
 
input market imperfections; coverage of short-run production costs; and farmers’ expectation about future 
government decisions on agricultural policy (Abler and Blandford 2005). 
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Source: Author’s calculation. 
4.4. Adjustments in NPS Support 
Reported Input Subsidies 
The use of government budgetary outlays to state-owned agricultural input manufacturers (consisting of 
fertilizer, pesticide and mulching film producers) as NPS support in notifications is permitted by the AoA, 
although it over-simplifies the calculations.
10 Currently, government subsidies to input firms are provided 
through a combination of direct budgetary payments, VAT rebates (e.g., fertilizer firms are generally 
given 50 percent VAT rebate), cash subsidies (e.g., firms producing or importing diammonium phosphate 
(DAP) received RMB100 per ton of DAP in 2004) and other implicit subsidies through lowered 
transportation and electricity charges. It is thus difficult to assess the total government subsidies (both 
direct and indirect) that benefit farmers, who usually feel the effects through reduced ex-factory or 
purchase prices of agricultural inputs.  
It is also difficult to determine how much government subsidies actually end up with farmers. 
Some speculate that in China much of the government subsidies are used to cover losses resulting from 
inefficient operations; others argue that the subsidies have become part of the profits, even though the 
profit margin allowed by the government is relatively small. In both cases, however, subsidies are not 
fully transferred into lowered input prices that farmers pay. According to the AoA, subsidy measures 
directed to entities other than producers “shall be included to the extent that such measures benefit the 
producers of the basic agricultural products” (Annex 3, paragraph 7). Thus, one could argue a downward 
adjustment of budgetary outlays has to be made to reflect actual subsidies to farmers. 
Generally speaking, government input subsidies are distributed between input producers and 
consumers (farmers in this case) with the extent of each depending on supply and demand elasticities. A 
rough estimate of subsidies that accrue to farmers can be made by comparing the subsidized prices with 
the higher, subsidy-free prices. This is consistent with the AoA provision “where the use of budgetary 
                                                      
10 Paragraph 13 in Annex 3 of the AoA stipulates that “other non-exempt measures, including input subsidies and other 
measures such as marketing-cost reduction measures: the value of such measures shall be measured using government budgetary 
outlays….” 20 
 
outlays does not reflect the full extent of the subsidy concerned, the basis for calculating the subsidy shall 
be the gap between the price of the subsidized good or service and a representative market price for a 
similar good or service multiplied by the quantity of the good or service.” (Annex 3, paragraph 13). In the 
absence of other distorting factors, the representative market (or subsidy-free) prices would be the 
relevant world prices, adjusted for transportation and distribution costs. This price gap method, however, 
can be applied to estimate subsidies that reduce the end-use price of inputs, omitting from consideration 
other measures that actually raise the price of inputs to the users. These “other” measures typically refer 
to border measures, which, when present, would make subsidy-free prices differ from the comparable 
world reference prices.  
In China, the input manufacturing industry has long been protected from foreign competition 
(Qiao et al. 2003). Imports of agricultural inputs such as fertilizers are subject to TRQs and state trading, 
which have kept domestic prices high. In some years, domestic agricultural input prices are higher than 
world reference prices, even after subsidization (and thus the net policy effect is a taxation of consumers 
of agricultural inputs). In this case, world prices cannot be used as a proper reference price to gauge price 
gaps as a result of subsidies. Instead, counterfactual simulations are sometimes needed in order to obtain 
the correct subsidy-free prices. One such counterfactual assessment, based on the Policy Analysis Matrix 
for Chinese agriculture, indicated that subsidies reduced input prices by between 13 and 30 percent on 
average between 1996-1998 (Fang and Beghin 2000). However, in recent years, agricultural input prices 
have risen at a faster rate than overall price inflation, suggesting that the effects of subsidies may have 
declined.  
Agricultural Taxes 
NPS support needs to be further adjusted to take into account various missing components in the 
notification, including agricultural taxes and subsidies related to irrigation, electricity and fuel (to be 
discussed below). There are two views as to how to incorporate agricultural taxes in the notification. One 
view holds that the taxes paid by farmers need to be subtracted from the NPS support. Compared to other 
countries, China may be the only one in the world to levy a high agricultural tax rate on farmers, which 
had stood as high as an average of 8 percent recently. Table 7 shows the various agricultural taxes from 
1990-2005.  
Not only are agricultural taxes burdensome, but they are levied differently from taxes on other 
sectors of the economy. For instance, agricultural taxes are levied exclusively on farmers. For instance, 
China’s urban taxes are generally levied on net profits, which allows adjustments for costs. In contrast, 
agricultural taxes are based on the amount of cultivated land and number of family members; hence 
farmers are obliged to pay the same amount of taxes both in prosperous and lean years. According to the 
AoA, specific agricultural levies or fees paid by producers should be deducted from the AMS (Annex 3, 
paragraph 4). As contract taxes and taxes on the use of cultivated land do not directly affect farmers, the 
deduction should at least include agricultural taxes, animal husbandry taxes and taxes on special 
agricultural products. These three taxes added up to RMB42.4 billion in 2003, but dropped sharply to less 
than RMB6 billion in 2005. 
A different view is that agricultural taxes should not be deducted from the AMS; rather, the 
elimination of these taxes should be counted as a subsidy. The AoA stipulates that trade distorting 
subsidies include “revenues forgone by governments or their agents” in addition to budgetary outlays. 
The agricultural tax exemption by its very nature seems to meet this requirement as the government has 
“foregone revenue” that would otherwise be due. The drops in the amount of agricultural tax and animal 
husbandry tax combined in 2004 and 2005 were RMB9,222 million and RMB18,259 million, 
respectively.  21 
 
Table 8. Agricultural taxes in China, 1990-2005 (million RMB)  
Year Total  Agricultural  tax 
and animal 
husbandry tax 
Contract tax  Tax on special 
agricultural 
products 
Tax on use of 
cultivated land 
1990  8,786 5,962  118 1,249 1,457 
1991  9,065 5,665  189 1,425 1,786 
1992  11,917 7,010  361 1,624 2,922 
1993  12,574 7,265  621 1,753 2,935 
1994  23,149  11,951  1,182 6,369 3,647 
1995  27,809  12,812  1,826 9,717 3,454 
1996  36,946 18,206  2,520 13,100  3,120 
1997  39,748 18,238  3,234 15,027  3,249 
1998  39,880 17,867  5,899 12,779  3,335 
1999  42,350 16,308  9,596 13,143  3,303 
2000  46,531 16,817  13,108 13,074  3,532 
2001  48,170 16,432  15,708 12,197  3,833 
2002  71,785  32,149 23,907 9,995 5,734 
2003  87,177  33,422 35,805 8,960 8,990 
2004  90,219 24,200  54,010  0 12,009 
2005 93,640  5,941  73,514  0  14,185 
Source: NBS, 2006 
Agricultural tax exemptions also have the attributes of subsidies defined under the WTO 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement (Article 1). Two essential components of this 
definition are that there is a financial contribution by government and a benefit received by the recipient 
(SCM Article 1.1.). “Financial contribution” is itself a defined term in the SCM Agreement, and explicitly 
includes a range of situations other than direct cash payments, such as provision of goods and services or 
tax breaks where the government foregoes revenue “otherwise due.” “Benefit” denotes the requirement 
that a subsidy must confer a competitive advantage on the recipient; the notion of advantage is understood 
by reference to the conditions the recipient would otherwise have to face in a competitive marketplace, in 
the absence of the government intervention in question. An agricultural tax exemption clearly has both 
components and thus is a subsidy in SCM terms. Such an exemption becomes “actionable” if it is found 
to have effects contrary to the interests of another member (SCM Article 5). When this occurs, the 
country providing the exemption, in this case China, must take action to remove the adverse effects of the 
subsidy or withdraw it. Otherwise, the complaining member may take countermeasures commensurate 
with the degree and nature of the adverse effects (SCM Article 7). 
Non-reported Input Subsidies 
Irrigation subsidies are not included in the calculations, even though they may constitute a significant 
component in China’s NPS support. In China, irrigation accounts for more than two thirds of total water 
use, although its share has been decreasing as a result of rising competition from uses in non-agricultrual 
sectors (e.g., industry) (Crook and Diao 2000). Major irrigation systems have been built and operated by 
government agencies (i.e., Ministry of Water Resources and local Water Resource Bureaus). Typically, 
irrigation water users are charged only a fraction of the cost of supplying water to them. The charges do 
not cover operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, and they never cover any of the substantial capital 
costs incurred in developing water collection and distribution systems. In some areas, charges for water 
are on a volumetric basis; in others, charges are based on the area irrigated rather than on the amount 
used. In both cases, however, charges are paid by townships, villages, and irrigation groups, not by 22 
 
farmers, thus increasing incentives for overuse. For privately financed irrigation (e.g., wells and 
groundwater delivery systems), energy for water pumping is often subsidized. 
A rough estimate of the extent of subsidies for irrigation water can be made from available 
information. Since data on annual depreciation of the capital stock are not available, average annual 
capital investment is used to approximate annual depreciation. In China, new irrigation land has been 
created each year during 1996-2005 except for 2003. The average unit cost of supplying irrigation can be 
assumed to be US$5,300 per hectare (1995 prices), an Asian average according to Jones (1995). Annual 
investments in irrigation, therefore, are the product of new irrigation and the unit cost. Operations and 
maintenance costs can be roughly estimated as 10 percent of the annual capital investment (Repetto 
1986). Total annual irrigation costs are the sum of capital investments and O&M costs. Assuming that 
cost recovery is only 65 percent of operations and maintenance costs, total annual irrigation subsidies in 
China can be estimated and are presented in Table 9. For the period 1996-2005, an estimated average of 
RMB32 billion is provided to irrigation annually in China. Note that this estimate does not include the 
opportunity cost of water in alternative uses or the associated environmental externalities. 
Table 9. Estimated subsidies for irrigation in China 1996-2005  
Year 
Annual increase 









  000’ ha  --- mil. RMB --- 
1996 1,262  55,533  5,553  61,086  57,477 
1997 857  37,704  3,770  41,474  39,023 
1998 1,058  46,519  4,652  51,171  48,148 
1999 862  37,937  3,794  41,731  39,265 
2000 662  29,117  2,912  32,029  30,136 
2001 429  18,876  1,888  20,764  19,537 
2002 105  4,637  464  5,100  4,799 
2003 --  --  --  --  -- 
2004 465  20,442  2,044  22,486  21,158 
2005 551  24,221  2,422  26,643  25,069 
Average 695  30,554  3,055  33,609  31,624 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
Note: O&M costs are assumed to be 10 percent of annual capital investments and cost recovery is 65 percent of O&M costs. 
Estimates for 2003 are not available due to a decrease in irrigated land.  
In China, agricultural users are charged discounted rates for electricity and fuels, relative to others 
in China.
11 Subsidies for agricultural energy uses, however, are not included in the notification because 
there are no budgetary outlay figures available. Similar to other input subsidies discussed above, 
electricity and fuel subsidies can be measured by the difference between actual prices and reference prices 
that would prevail in an undistorted market. The reference price can be either the border price for 
internationally traded energy products (i.e., fuels) or the cost of production for non-traded ones (i.e., 
electricity). Because of the existence of other distortions that affect the border price as well as the 
difficulty of obtaining production cost data, a substitute reference price based on the average domestic 
market energy price is used in this analysis. This is in accordance with the AoA, which stipulates that the 
basis for calculating the subsidy in the absence of budgetary outlays “shall be the gap between the price of 
the subsidized good or service and a representative market price for a similar good or service multiplied 
by the quantity of the good or service” (Annex 3, paragraph 13). However, it is important to note that this 
price wedge method only captures the market transfers from other energy consumers to agricultural users, 
or cross-subsidization, which may well underestimate the actual magnitude of the subsidies. Table 10 
shows electricity subsidies for agricultural uses for 1996-2005.
12 
                                                      
11 Lower electricity prices apply only to agricultural production use not residential use. 
12 Fuel subsidies are not reported due to data constraints. 23 
 
Table 10. Electricity subsidies 1996-2005 
 Ag.  Usage Electricity  Price Price  Wedge  Subsidies 
   Agriculture  Average     
  bil. kw  --- RMB/kw ---  mil. RMB 
1996 168  0.51  0.41  0.10  16,765 
1997 198  0.49  0.39  0.10  19,024 
1998 204  0.48  0.39  0.09  19,220 
1999 217  0.46  0.37  0.09  19,603 
2000 242  0.45  0.36  0.09  21,364 
2001 261  0.45  0.36  0.09  23,030 
2002 299  0.43  0.35  0.08  25,238 
2003 343  0.43  0.35  0.08  28,944 
2004 393  0.4  0.32  0.08  30,847 
2005 438  0.35  0.28  0.07  30,029 
Average 276  0.45  0.36  0.09  23,407 
Source: Author’s calculation 
The input subsidies reported in the official notifications (under NPS support in Table 5) average 
about RMB17 billion per annum for 1996-2005. The inclusion of non-reported subsidies would 
significantly increase this support level. When only irrigation and electricity subsidies are taken into 
account, an average of RMB55 billion will be added. However, even if these subsidies were to be 
reported, the NPS support in the notification would still be much smaller than the de minimis levels 
(averaging RMB204 billion for 1996-2005) resulting from China’s large value of agricultural production. 
However, if all non-reported input subsidies are included in the official notifications, China will have less 
room to extend new NPS support to its farmers. Low domestic support levels in WTO terms differ from 
the PSEs reported by the OECD that show an average of RMB124 billion provided to the farmers during 
1996-2005 (OECD 2007). In the PSEs, however, the MPS are calculated using current domestic and 
world reference prices, and are generally positive in this period. It also differs from more disaggregated 
studies, which show divergent support features for different commodities (Huang et al. 2007).    24 
 
5.  DOMESTIC SUPPORT PROJECTION AND WTO COMMITMENTS  
5.1. Projections of Notification, 2006-2013 
The rapid evolution of China’s agricultural support policies has become an important element in the 
present trade policy debates in the Doha Round, along with continued discussion of farm policy in 
developed countries where subsidies are most prominent. Looking ahead, it appears that a reversal of 
subsidy policies in China is unlikely, given the economic progress the country is making. Rather, there 
are indications that the subsidies will be continued and even strengthened in the coming years. Assuming 
that China’s agricultural policies evolve as expected, one can also ask whether China will violate the 
relevant disciplines on agricultural domestic support contained in the Uruguay Round (UR) AoA or 
tighter rules that might be negotiated in the new round. Table 11 shows a projection of domestic support 
notification into 2013 under current UR rules and Chinese commitments. Appendix B presents more 
detailed calculations. The projection of PS support (and in particular market price support) distinguishes 
two administered price scenarios (high vs. medium price) and two program coverage scenarios (four vs. 
two commodities).
13 The scenario designs follow recent world commodity market developments and 
domestic policy deliberations.  
For instance, there has been a world commodity market boom during the past few years with 
prices of key commodities forecast to rise consistently through 2016 (USDA 2007). For rice and wheat, 
the USDA predicted price increases for the period 2005-2013 are 24.7 percent and 31.6 percent, 
respectively. Continued strong global economic growth, increased oil prices, and strong demand for corn 
and sugar for ethanol production are likely to lead to upward adjustments in future forecasts. Although 
domestic price changes will reflect to a large extent the global market situation, a number of other factors 
including domestic and trade policies, location and status as exporter or importer, macroeconomic 
environment and exchange rate fluctuations are also important. Exactly how much of the world price 
increases passes through to domestic prices and at what point these will trigger a change in administered 
prices remain largely uncertain. The same uncertainty applies to price forecasts themselves as changes in 
policies and weather conditions are hard to predict.  
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, policy makers and researchers in China concur that the 
current support prices for wheat and rice are too low (Xinhua Net 2007). Recommendations to increase 
these prices have been made in various State Council meetings.
14 Because of recently soaring inflation 
rates for food and agricultural products (reaching 20 percent by the end of 2007), we argue that, under a 
high price scenario, an increase of minimum prices by 20 percent will occur, while under a medium price 
scenario the increase will be 10 percent. We assume that each administered price increase will remain 
effective for three consecutive years, i.e., 2008-2010 and 2011-2013, respectively (in reality, however, 
small adjustments may occur within each period). In addition to price increases, there are also policy 
discussions on whether the minimum price system should be extended beyond wheat and rice to include 
cotton and corn. Therefore, two commodity coverage scenarios are compared for the notifications. 
 
                                                      
13 The scenario of low commodity prices is also possible but not presented. Given that China will comply with its WTO 
commitments under the medium price scenario (to be discussed), the same conclusion can be drawn for the low price scenario.   
14 The minimum prices for wheat and rice remained unchanged in 2006 and 2007 but were increased by about 10 percent in 
early 2008.  25 
 
Table 11. Projection of China’s notification under current WTO commitments, 2006-2013 (million RMB) 
Policy  Category  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Green Box
  317,235 337,809 358,383 378,957 399,531 420,105 440,679 461,253 
          
Product-Specific  Support            
High Price          
   A: Total (before de minimis)  -62,665 -62,802 -21,486 -20,793 -20,099  33,331  35,022  36,713 
        Total (after de minimis)  0  0 7,874 8,107 8,341  40,099  41,134  42,168 
   B: Total (before de minimis)  -44,294 -43,778 -24,504 -23,875 -23,246  296  1,060  1,823 
        Total (after de minimis)  0 0 0 0 0  13,832  14,152  14,472 
Medium Price          
   A: Total (before de minimis)  -62,665 -62,802 -42,213 -41,935 -41,657 -17,208 -16,473 -15,738 
        Total (after de minimis)  0 0 0 0 0  9,311  9,564  9,818 
   B: Total (before de minimis)  -44,294 -43,778 -33,882 -33,310 -32,737 -21,662 -21,028 -20,393 
        Total (after de minimis)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
          
Non-Product-Specific  Support          
   Total (before de minimis)  10,751 10,373 10,355 13,624 13,350 13,816 13,803 13,420 
   Total (after de minimis)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
          
8.5% of Value of Production
  261,635 272,525 283,416 294,306 305,197 316,087 326,977 337,868 
          
Current  Total  AMS            
   High Price: A  0  0  7,874  8,107  8,341  40,099  41,134  42,168 
   High Price: B  0  0  0  0  0  13,832  14,152  14,472 
   Medium Price: A  0  0  0  0  0  9,311  9,564  9,818 
      Medium  Price:  B  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
          
OTDS (High Price: A)  -51,914  -52,429  -11,131 -7,168 -6,749 47,147 48,825 50,133 
Note: 1. High price: administered price increases 20 percent in 2008-2010 and a further 20 percent in 2011-2013. Medium price: administered price increases 10 percent in 2008-
2010 and a further 10 percent in 2011-2013. 
          2. A: program-covered commodities include wheat, rice, corn and cotton. B: program-covered commodities include wheat and rice.  
          3. PS support only includes Market Price Support. 
          4. Projection of green box, NPS support and production is based on linear regression. 
          5. Because of negative MPS, support after de minimis might be higher than that before de minimis. 
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Furthermore, we assume in our analysis that direct payments to farmers will be notified in the 
green box, even though the results of the US/Brazil cotton dispute settlement have called into question the 
exact nature of such payments. China has sporadically provided product-specific (e.g., seed subsidies) and 
non-product-specific (e.g., machinery subsidies) support to grain producers. But because of the 
uncertainty of the continuous provision of these subsidies, we did not include them in the projection. 
Neither did we include subsidies related to irrigation, electricity and fuel, because they were not reported 
in the previous two official notifications and are not likely to be reported in the future. We further 
assumed that China will not report under the blue box, although the country may be forced to report in 
this box as a result of a progressively higher level of trade-distorting support. Projection of the green box, 
NPS support and quantity of production is based on a linear extrapolation of historical figures for the 
period of 1996-2005. 
Assuming “business as usual” (i.e., a continuation of Uruguay Round rules at the WTO), China 
will comply with its commitments if current commodity programs are continued and there are no 
dramatic increases in support prices. This corresponds to a medium-price, two-commodity minimum price 
support program scenario (Medium Price: B in Table 11). However, if domestic administered prices 
increase by 20 percent in 2008-2010 and a further 20 percent in 2011-2013, and price support extends to 
cotton and corn (High Price: A), China’s AMS may exceed its de minimis ceiling as early as 2008. This 
occurs because the product specific support for cotton exceeds 8.5 percent of the value of cotton 
production (see Appendix Table B.1)    Violations of WTO commitments will occur at a later date (2011) 
if prices are low or current commodity program coverage is maintained (Medium Price: A or High Price: 
B). It is noted that failure by China to comply with its commitments either in the high price or extended 
commodity coverage scenario results from over-de minimis product-specific payments; NPS support will 
remain under its de minimis levels despite steady increases.
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5.2. Effects of a Potential Doha Round Agreement on Agriculture  
The most recent draft modalities put forward by Ambassador Crawford Falconer in August 2007 
(TN/AG/W/4) and clarified in the December 2007 “Working Documents” serve as the basis for further 
negotiations of a new Agreement on Agriculture at the WTO. The Falconer text retains some of the 
features of the present AoA  and it also makes recommendations for reforms in the three pillars of trade 
policy, namely, domestic support, market access, and export competition. Several new proposals on 
further constraining domestic support emerged in the modalities, which include a tiered harmonizing 
reduction of overall trade-distorting domestic support (OTDS) and final bound total AMS, product-
specific AMS limits, reduction of the de minimis, and a cap on and criteria for blue box payments. Table 
12 provides a brief summary of the main provisions in the modalities and their implications in terms of 
China’s domestic support commitments. 
The base level for the reduction of OTDS is the summation of the final bound total AMS ceiling, 
10 percent of the base-period (1995-2000) average VOP (20 percent for developing countries), and the 
higher of average blue box payments or 5 percent of the average VOP. A tiered reduction formula is 
developed so that countries with higher base OTDS are required to undertake higher reduction 
commitments. Similarly, a tiered approach is proposed for reducing final bound total AMS.
16 New caps 
are designed to limit PS support to below average PS AMS for 1995-2000, overall blue box payments to 
below 2.5 percent of VOP (5 percent for developing countries), and PS blue box payments to below base-
period average PS support. Specific provisions for cotton also apply. For China, because there is no final 
bound AMS, an 8.5 percent de minimis, and no historical blue box measures, the base level of OTDS is 
equal to 22 percent of VOP (8.5%+8.5%+5%). China’s status as a developing country with no AMS 
                                                      
15 Because of the negative MPS, PS support after de minimis can be higher than that before de minimis. For instance, in 
2008 (high price: A), PS support is RMB8 billion after de minimis and RMB-21 billion before de minimis.  
16 Reductions in OTDS and total AMS require a larger “first instalment” followed by smaller equal annual instalments over 
the rest of the implementation period.  27 
 
commitments at the UR exempts it from OTDS reductions. And for the same reason, China does not have 
to make commitments to reduce total AMS or the de minimis. During the base period, PS support in 
China remained consistently below the de minimis level so that the new cap on PS AMS is effectively the 
present de minimis converted to monetary terms. China is entitled to make blue box payments up to 5 
percent of average VOP while the PS cap in this category is 10 percent of the overall blue box ceiling. 
Table 12. Main provisions of draft modalities and China’s commitments 
Categories  Draft Modalities   China’s Commitments 
OTDS    
   Base Level  Final bound total AMS +10% (or 20%) 
VOP + higher of average blue box 
payment or 5% VOP 
22% VOP 
   Reduction  Tiered reduction   No reduction 
    
Total AMS    
   Base Level  Final bound values in 2000  0 
   Reduction  Tiered reduction   No reduction 
    
PS AMS    
   Cap  Base period average PS AMS   de minimis in monetary terms 
    
De Minimis    
   Reduction  50% or 60%  No reduction 
    
Blue Box    
   Overall Cap  2.5% or  5% VOP  5% VOP 
   PS Cap  Base-period average PS support  10% of overall blue box ceiling 
    
Cotton     
   AMS  Formula reduction  No reduction 
   Blue Box  1/3 of PS blue box cap  1/3 of PS blue box cap 
    
VOP    
Base Period  1995-2000 average  1996-2001 average 
Source: TN/AG/W/4 and author’s compilation 
If the above arguments are correct, then the possible new Agreement on Agriculture will have 
minimal impact on China’s current and future commitments. Most notably, the de minimis, which is to 
remain at 8.5 percent of VOP, will continue to be the binding factor for both PS and NPS domestic 
support. Because of China’s large value of production (an average of RMB2,150 billion during 1996-
2001), the limit on OTDS for China is RMB473 billion, is not a constraint for the country even under the 
highest support scenario (high administered price with four covered commodities) (see Table 11, last 
row). The new blue box implies that China can extend domestic support up to RMB108 billion overall 
and RMB11 billion for a specific product, provided that such support satisfies the blue box criteria set out 
in the new agreement. As China’s PS AMS commitment of the draft modalities remain the same as the 
current one, i.e., de minimis of 8.5% of product specific VOP, support to certain key commodities would 
exceed the limits in high-price (wheat and cotton) and medium-price (cotton) scenarios (Table B.1.).  
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6.  CONCLUSION 
Agriculture has long been heavily subsidized, especially in developed nations. Agricultural subsidies 
came into sharp focus during the 1986–1994 negotiations of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA). One of the landmark achievements in the AoA was the extension of multiple 
disciplines from border measures to domestic policies. These disciplines are also important for some 
developing countries, where rapid economic growth has brought about shifts in domestic policies toward 
increasing subsidization of the agricultural sector. The present paper provides an analysis of recent 
changes in agricultural policies in China and empirical estimates of China’s domestic support for 
agriculture. 
The methods used in the estimation of the “shadow” domestic support notifications are based on 
those reported in official WTO documents. In general, our results indicated that, unless there are 
legitimate challenges that notifications should be made otherwise, China’s domestic support for the recent 
period (1996-2006) has been well below the limits agreed at its WTO accession. However, there are a 
number of interesting features that warrant further examination.  
First, China’s level of green box support has grown as a result of increased public investment in 
the agricultural sector. In 2006, total green box support reached RMB289 billion, more than double the 
1996 figure (RMB112 billion). Second, China has no AMS commitments but can provide trade-distorting 
domestic support to agricultural producers up to 8.5 percent of the value of production (China’s de 
minimis level). Third, the MPS component of the AMS has been far below zero, and this has dwarfed the 
relatively small but positive NPS AMS and led to a zero current total AMS after de minimis. Fourth, 
China has given up the right to use “special and differential treatment,” as provided in Article 6.2 of the 
AoA, to report subsidy measures that are exempt from the reduction commitments. Instead, subsidies of 
this type are counted in the amber box category. Finally, China has not reported any blue box measures, 
although it might do so in the future if the need arises. 
An economic critique of the AMS is presented and a comparison of the MPS based on alternative 
assumptions of reference prices and eligible production is made. We show that the MPS double-counts 
border measures and miscounts actual protection levels. This measurement issue becomes more important 
under scenarios where actual world prices change and China’s currency continues to strengthen. We 
provide a discussion of a set of relevant alternative subsidy-definition scenarios and their effects on the 
calculated levels of support when applied in the historical period of analysis. These scenarios include 
alternative decisions about what categories certain expenditures are notified within, as might arise from 
domestic reporting decisions or related dispute settlement cases at the WTO (e.g., do China’s direct 
payments to farmers belong to the amber or green box?), and inclusion of subsidies previously not 
included in notifications (e.g., irrigation, electricity, and fuel subsidies). 
We project domestic support notifications through 2013 based on specified assumptions about 
domestic policies, including changes in administered prices and commodity program coverage. Our 
projections indicate that China may exceed its WTO commitment levels under certain price and 
commodity coverage scenarios. New constraints/latitude potentially negotiated in the Doha Round are 
discussed, for example, new bindings on support levels in aggregate or for specific commodities, 
reductions in the de minimis, and redefinition of categories such as the blue box. Due to China’s 
developing country status, which means it has no UR AMS commitments, the impacts of these new 
constraints in terms of China’s WTO commitments are shown to be limited.  
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APPENDIX A. SUPPORTING DS TABLES 
Table A.1. DS1: Measures exempt from the reduction commitment – “Green Box” (million RMB)  
Measure  Type  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
a)  General  Services    66,648  74,542 135,949 109,110 121,230 145,045 115,284 124,829 140,616 137,021 
b) Public Stockholding for Food Security   28,773  35,335 51,027 47,596 53,799 59,685 48,172 52,264 62,079 53,746 
c)  Domestic  Food  Aid  2,012  1,875  1,766  2,640  2,360 683 160 128 128  93 
d)  Decoupled  Income  Support  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --  11,575  13,190 
e)  Income  Insurance  and  Safety-net  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
f)  Payments  for  Natural  Disaster  Relief  3,791 4,042 5,453 5,023 5,317 5,956 5,808 7,216 7,725 9,276 
g) Structural Adjustment Assistance 
provided through producer retirement 
programs 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
h) Structural Adjustment Assistance 
provided through resource retirement 
programs 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
i) Structural Adjustment Assistance 
provided through investment aids  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
j) Environmental Programs  4,954  5,460  5,620  7,097 12,700 17,475 33,346 46,862 51,994 55,386 
k) Regional Assistance Programs  6,000  10,000  11,000 12,869 12,493 13,487 12,926 16,062 17,195 20,646 
Total  112,178 131,254 210,815 184,335 207,899 242,331 215,696 247,361 291,312 289,358 
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Table A.2. DS 4, 5, 6, 7: Product specific support and total product specific AMS 
Product   Ref. Price 
1  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
   
  RMB/ton Administered Price (RMB/ton) 
      Wheat  1,698  1,480 1,410 1,340 1,254 1,136 1,124 1,025 1,128 1,489 1,380 
      Rice  2,659  2,161 2,038 1,893 1,152 1,152 1,124 1,511 1,766 1,400 1,400 
      Corn  1,199  1,120  1,170  1,120 926 936 918 918 918 918 918 
    
          Eligible Production (000’ tons) 
      Wheat   15,000 46,002 27,956 37,800 35,050 38,600 42,013 36,820 34,481 37,452 
   Rice    15,750  35,105  25,620  45,100  44,900 30,600 21,896 21,098 21,381 25,723 
   Corn    12,500  26,922  38,674  53,500  37,250 31,100 41,820 37,025 31,581 45,299 
    
    Market Price Support (million RMB) 
2 
      Wheat    -6,075 -11,223  -6,541 -16,783 -19,698 -22,156 -28,275 -20,973  -7,193 -11,902 
      Rice   -17,647  -9,970 -12,011 -67,966 -67,664 -46,971 -25,126 -18,831 -26,919 -32,385 
   Corn    -5,767  2,401  6,171  -14,606  -9,797  -8,739  -11,751  -10,404  -8,874  -12,729 
    
    Other Non-Exempt PS Support 
3 
   Wheat
   -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
      Rice     -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
      Corn     -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
             
    8.5% of Value of Production (million RMB) 
      Wheat   15,227 14,695 12,420 11,685  8,957 8,380 7,867 8,295  11,641  11,432 
   Rice    26,791  23,666  22,602  19,095  16,528 16,205 15,248 16,404 24,301 23,842 
      Corn    12,402 9,872  12,157 7,632 7,221 7,764 8,624 9,292  10,997  12,154 
             
PS AMS (after de minimis)              
      Wheat   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Rice     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Corn   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: 1. Reference prices are fixed, 1996-1998 average border prices.  
          2. In calculating the Market Price Support, actual border prices and fixed, 1996-1998 average border prices are used for 1996-1998 and 1999-2005, respectively.  
          3. Other non-exempt PS support was provided to cotton through interest subsidies for national cotton stockholdings during 1999-2001. From 2003-2005, this support 
included seed subsidies. However, due to a lack of data, they are not allocated to specific commodities.  
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Table A.3. DS 9: Non-product-specific AMS (million RMB) 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Non-Product-Specific  Support            
   Input Subsidies 
1  26,559 24,524 33,242  205  151  148  9,871  6,051 14,952 43,096 
   Interest Subsidies 
2  1,468  1,535 880 495 594 600 520 319 787  2,268 
Total (before de minimis)  28,027 26,059 34,122  700  745  748 10,391  6,370 15,739 45,364 
            
8.5% of Total Value of Production
  166,258 175,640 180,562 186,916 188,727 198,599 198,783 207,476 257,653 279,855 
            
NPS AMS (after de minimis)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: 1. Input subsidies were primarily price subsidies for means of production provided to agricultural input manufacturers including fertilizer, pesticide and mulching film firms.  
          2. Interest subsidies are provided to agricultural producers through loans with preferential interest rates. 32 
 
APPENDIX B. PROJECTION OF CHINA’S NOTIFICATIONS 
Table B.1. Product-specific support 
 Product   Ref. Price
 1  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 RMB/ton  Administered  Price: High Price (RMB/ton)  
   Wheat  1,698  1,380  1,380  1,656 1,656 1,656 1,987 1,987 1,987 
   Rice  2,659  1,400  1,400  1,680 1,680 1,680 2,016 2,016 2,016 
      Corn  1,199  918  918 1,102 1,102 1,102 1,322 1,322 1,322 
   Cotton     14,584  13,458  13,458  16,149 16,149 16,149 19,379 19,379 19,379 
    
    Administered Price: Medium Price (RMB/ton) 
   Wheat    1,380  1,380  1,518  1,518 1,518 1,670 1,670 1,670 
   Rice    1,400  1,400  1,540  1,540 1,540 1,694 1,694 1,694 
      Corn    918  918 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,111 1,111 1,111 
   Cotton    13,458  13,458  14,803  14,803 14,803 16,284 16,284 16,284 
    
    Eligible Production (000’ tons) 
   Wheat    42,294  43,401  44,507  45,614 46,721 47,827 48,934 50,040 
   Rice    24,499  23,810  23,120  22,430 21,740 21,050 20,361 19,671 
   Corn    46,400  48,131  49,862  51,593 53,324 55,055 56,786 58,517 
   Cotton    4,733  4,882  5,031  5,180 5,329 5,478 5,627 5,776 
    
    Market Price Support: High Price (million RMB) 
2 
   Wheat    -13,450  -13,801  -1,869 -1,916 -1,962 13,832 14,152 14,472 
   Rice    -30,845  -29,976  -22,634  -21,959 -21,284 -13,535 -13,092 -12,648 
   Corn    -13,038  -13,525  -4,857  -5,025  -5,194 6,767 6,980 7,193 
   Cotton    -5,332  -5,500  7,874  8,107  8,341 26,268 26,982 27,697 
    
    Market Price Support: Medium Price (million RMB) 
2 
   Wheat    -13,450  -13,801  -8,011  -8,211 -8,410 -1,349 -1,380 -1,411 
   Rice    -30,845  -29,976  -25,871  -25,099 -24,327 -20,314 -19,648 -18,982 
   Corn    -13,038  -13,525  -9,434  -9,761  -10,089 -4,857 -5,010 -5,162 
   Cotton    -5,332  -5,500  1,103 1,136 1,169 9,311 9,564 9,818 
    
    8.5% of Value of Production (million RMB) 
   Wheat    8,120  7,586  7,051  6,517 5,982 5,448 4,914 4,379 
   Rice    18,290  17,892  17,494  17,097 16,699 16,302 15,904 15,507 
   Corn    10,697  11,004  11,310  11,617 11,924 12,230 12,537 12,844 
   Cotton    5,588  5,727  5,867  6,006 6,146 6,285 6,425 6,564 
            
PS AMS (after de minimis)           
    High Price (million RMB) 
   Wheat    0  0  0  0  0  13,832  14,152  14,472 
      Rice    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Corn    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   Cotton    0  0  7,874  8,107  8,341  26,268  26,982  27,697 
            
    Medium Price (million RMB) 
      Wheat    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Rice    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Corn    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   Cotton    0  0  0  0  0  9,311  9,564  9,818 
Note: 1. Reference prices are fixed, 1996-1998 average border prices.  
          2. Market Price Support is the only component of PS support due to a lack of data.33 
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